PaPer examines the shifts in attitudes to foreign investment; charts the dimensions and composition of capital flows to develeping countries; outlines existing barriers and the effects of taxation on these flows, and critically examines the demand for their regulation in the light of the Asian crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade there has been a sea change in public attitudes to international investment around the world . European states (see Lipson (1985) ). Most developing country governments (and many European ones too)
being both nationalist and dirigiste, sought to regulate, tax or nationalize particular foreign investments on grounds of national social utility rather than any particular antagonism to private
property. This made it difficult for the US to identify expropriation of foreign capital with a socialist ideology, as the nationalization of foreign oil companies in the 1960's and early 70's by right-wing governments in the Middle East proved. With exchange controls ubiquitous in the Third World, short term capital flows were also effectively snuffed out. Official capital flows filled the breach (see La1 (1996) But a backlash against the political effects of this globalization-particularly as it effects the role of national governments in the economy-is already in place and poses an incipient threat to the recently resurrected LIEO. There are ongoing attempts to regulate the offshore banking centers, and various variants on the Tobin tax being proposed to throw sands in the working of international financial mechanisms to allow the old Keynesian policies-which depended on controls of short term capital-some room to work. These regulatory proposals also hope to reduce the purported volatility of short term flows-which on one view is due to the their speculative nature-and which is supposed to have brought the Asian tigers to their knees. These are also issues I take up later. multinational companies. This is described as "just in time production" by the World Bank (1977) . In this contemporary version of an international 'putting out system' the centers in developed 8 countries provide the design and marketing capacity for the production of bespoke products tailored to changing and highly differentiated tastes, which are produced 'just in time' by flexible production facilities in the cheapest production locations around the world-most often in developing countries. 
III. ARE WORLD CAPITAL MARKETS INTEGRATED?
But how well integrated are world capital markets, or are they still segmented by regulatory and tax barriers? Answering this question has spawned a vast literature masterfully surveyed by Obstfeld (1995) (Also see Lessard (1991) As the real world relevance of this nirvana economics is questionable (see Lal(1998) ) it is hardly surprising that these predictions are not borne out.
Nor can much be made of the stylized facts used to suggest that international capital markets are inefficient (see Lessard (1991) as the data on savings and investment rates is readily available, faut mieux, at least an imperfect measure of capital market integration can be derived. There are moreover, two sets of data 2See Obstfeld (1995) for details.
(with somewhat different countries covered) which allow us to obtain estimates of b from the late 19th century to the present.
These are those compiled by Taylor (1996) and Maddison (1991 Maddison ( , 1992 . Taylor into the post-war period till the 1960s. This was followed by some increased integration, but which did not become marked till the 1980s. So that now the index is roughly where it was in 1870. Harberger (1980) has rightly argued that for judging capital market integration the evidence on rates of returns to private capital is more relevant than these savings-investment regressions. Basing himself on the estimates he made of aggregate real rates of return to capital in 18 countries in Harberger (1978) and summaries of studies of private rates of return to private capital in 6 countries, as well as estimates of gross capital flows in and out of 100 countries as a fraction of each one's gross investment, he concludes that, the evidence is in consonance with the expectation of a reasonably well-functioning world capital market. But this is not the textbook model of a perfect capital market where changes in investment are completely mediated by corresponding movements in the country's capital 3See Taylor (1996, p. 13) for details and references. For the current period see Obstfeld (1995) and Goldstein (1993) . In addition there are a number of policy induced set of potential barriers to the efficient functioning of international capital markets identified by Lessard (1991) . These are :
(1) capital controls (2) tax regime interactions which effectively impose a tax on cross-border flows (3) discrimination between domestic and foreign claimants in contract enforcement.
These are the barriers we examine in the next two sections.
IV. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL FLOWS.
To see the variety of disincentives and incentives to the major form of international flows -FDI- Table 3 provides UNCTAD's summary of the major policies effecting the entry and operations of foreign investors. It is impossible in this paper to examine all these in any detail, but there is a simple framework which allows us to integrate various aspects of the policy regime to judge the determinants of the social profitability of FDI from the viewpoint of the host country.
The first point to note is that, all the public interventions effecting a particular FDI can in principle be identified as equivalent to particular taxes and subsidies, which effect the income stream of the foreign investor, and the host country's national income. Using the social cost benefit framework for project evaluation developed by Little-Mirrlees (1974) 4 we can succinctly express the net social benefit (NSB) and net private benefit (NPB) from the operation of FDI in any year(t) as:
where the time subscripts (t) have been suppressed and :
Pf is the border ('world') price of the output (x) and inputs (i)
Pd is the domestic price of output (x) and inputs (i) Substituting for (d+v) in I from II, yields:
The contribution of the last four terms to NSB from FDI measure its direct benefits, viz, through the direct taxes paid, the return to associated domestic capital in the case of a joint venture5, the net capital inflow and any net external effects associated with the project. The third term represents the net implicit tax on the foreigner for using domestic labor at a wage above its social opportunity cost, whilst the first two terms take 5 This term will only contribute to the NSB from FDI compared with an identical project financed from domestic sources if the return to domestic capitalists is higher than the social discount rate in the country. For to get the NPV of the FDI, the stream of dated NSB's given by III, has to be discounted by this rate. account of the effects of the protective regime, with tariffs on the FDI's output providing a subsidy and on its inputs a tax. The combined effects of these two trade related measures can be shown by making use of the definition of the effective rate of protection (EPRY I which yields the respective net benefits as:
where V* is value added at world prices.
It is immediately apparent that a free trade regime maximizes the social benefits from FDI to the host country, whereas inducing import substituting, tariff-jumping FDI could harm the country as has in fact been found by numerous empirical studies.
(see Lal(1975); La11 and Streeten (1977) , Balasubramanyam and Sapsford (1996) ). These expressions also show that all the so-called concessions or discriminatory measures for inducing or retarding different types of FDI shown in Table 3 frontier is given by MCOQ. Assuming that the government can finance its expenditures in both periods through lump-sum taxes, the private consumption point will be at Cl, with the domestic rate of substitution in consumption being equated to the domestic and foreign rates of transformation.
Suppose the government has to use distortionary taxes to 'also see Frenkel and Razin (1996) . What, if more realistically the State is not run by Platonic
Guardians, as this theory assumes, but is predatory? The relevant framework is provided by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . To limit the predatoriness of the State, they rightly recommend that, instead of the optimal tax theorem that the State should levy taxes on goods and factors of production whose demand and supply curves are relatively inelastic (which minimizes the Harberger triangle losses associated with distortionary taxation), the predatory State should be constitutionally limited to only levy taxes on goods and factors that are in relatively elastic supply. This allows 'exit' and hence limits the amount that a revenue maximizing predatory state can garner.
As it turns out, in an integrated world economy, mobile capital's supply is likely to be fairly elastic. Even if its direct taxation is based on the residence principle to ensure second best productive efficiency, as long as the State finds it difficult to tax foreign-source income because of enforcement difficulties, the otherwise predatory behavior which would ensue if it could effectively implement the residence principle, will be restrained-as domestic residents shift their capital from home to abroad. The net effect will be that in practice the predatory state will only be able to tax domestic source income but without introducing the distortion which would be caused to productive efficiency if it used the source principle of taxation! This can be seen from Fig.5 , where in fact the tax equilibrium shown for the residence principle is not-as is common in optimal tax theory-for some socially optimal level of government consumption, but for the predatory revenue-maximizing level:
given by the tangency of the after tax private intertemporal consumption frontier MQ with the price consumption curve PCC. But now, without the ability to enforce taxation of foreign source income, domestic residents can escape the predatory tax rate by shifting their domestic investment abroad-on which in effect there is no effective taxation. As the prey flees, the predator will have to reduce the tax rate, hoping that at low enough rates it will not be worth domestic resident's while to evade the tax on their foreign source income.' A natural limit would have been placed on the predatory state's base instincts, whilst still maintaining productive efficiency.l' 'However, as Razin and Sadka (1991) show if foreign source income cannot be taxed, then a Platonic Guardian government would institute capital controls on second best social welfare grounds. But of course, as much of optimal tax theory this is a recommendation which would be in the interests of the predator and not the prey if government's are not (as we know they are not) Platonic.
"Within the optimal tax framework Razin et al (1998) show that if there are information asymmetries which impede flows of foreign debt investment and foreign equity flows, these flows should be taxed differently from FDI for which there should be no capital income tax for non-residents. For the others ,the nonresident tax rate is lower than for residents for foreign debt and negative for foreign equity flows. There are no domestic corporate taxes charged on FDI, but these are positive in the case of equity and high in the case of foreign debt flows.
How does this principle relate to the cost-benefit formula developed above? If the residence principle is applied then no taxes should be levied on the foreign investor, for while this may increase the social return from one particular investment, by discouraging foreign investment in general, it will lower its total value below the socially optimal level. There is however one case where the host country should levy a tax on the foreign investor. This is if the foreign investor's home country grants tax credits against foreign taxes paid. In that case the home country should levy a tax on the foreign investor at the rate it would have to pay in its own country-on the residence principle-if it paid no tax in the country of its operation.
Given the multiplicity of tax regimes and their complex interactions not much more can be said about the general principles for taxing foreign investment. By and large, in an increasingly integrated world capital market, taxes on capital (both domestic and foreign) will faut de mieux have to remain low. This is an outcome that classical liberals should applaud.
However, there have been calls for tax harmonization of tax regimes on foreign capital, and a proposal by the OECD to attempt to regulate so called offshore tax havens-on the grounds that these are now mainly centers for money laundering, particularly by the large worldwide drug industry. As regards the latter argument, as Krueger (1998) has rightly argued, the illegal drug industry and its massive profits are the result of inappropriate public policies towards drugs. The 'distortion'-in the parlance of the modern theory of trade and welfare-that the regulation of drugs attempts to cure is a 'domestic distortion', due to a purported negative externality in the consumption of drugs. As is well known, this requires a domestic tax (which could be infinite-implying a consumption ban) to correct the distortion. Attempting to effect supply by either imposing restrictions on domestic or foreign production (through supply measures or tariffs and quotas) will lower domestic welfare. Most of the illegal drug profits are generated by the 18 restrictions and regulations imposed on suppliers. These are inefficient and also inequitable. The optimal policy would be to legalize the drug trade but to impose taxes on the consumption of drugs in the consuming countries. If this is done, there would be no danger from money laundering to undermine the offshore banking centers. They could (as they should from a classical liberal viewpoint) continue to provide that competition amongst tax jurisdictions on the Tiebout principle, which will lead to the competitive harmonization of tax systems on capital on the residence principle. (Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991) ). There is no need for any centralized process of tax harmonization by governments.
The need for any such harmonization ,and hence for international co-operation, would only arise -in principle-if the authorities could manipulate the terms of trade. This case would be identical to that of foreign trade (see Jones(1967) However, it is even less likely than for foreign trade that any country (even one as large as the US and the prospective EU) will have enough monopoly or monopsony power in world capital markets to make it worthwhile to levy the equivalent 'optimal tariffs' on capital. Therefore, competition amongst different tax jurisdictions should lead to the optimal residence principle being adopted globally for the taxation of capital.ll I1 However, as Sinn (1990) has emphasized, for this ideal allocation of world capital to occur, each country needs to use the strict Schnaz-Haig-Simons definition of capital income, which excludes distortions due to accelerated depreciation, non-taxed
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V. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FLOWS
Thus it seems that capital market integration is going to lead to relatively benign tax regimes for capital worldwide. Much more worrying is the growing trend towards 'harmonizing' regulatory policies. These regulations concern both FDI ( in the form of anti-trust type regulations) as well as financial capital in the form mainly of foreign bank lending. I deal with both in turn.
There are two types of regulatory problems emerging for FDI.
The first is the desire to extend US style anti-trust legislation worldwide-to counteract the so-called 'monopolistic' power of global corporations.
The second, of particular relevance to developing countries-whose cash-strapped public sectors are forcing them to rely increasingly on FDI to finance and produce the infrastructure which has elements of natural monopoly-is to create regulatory regimes for privatized infrastructure services.
On these issues I can be brief, as I have dealt with them in some detail recently (La1 (1998a). The following points need to be borne in mind. First the intellectual basis for the regulatory regimes being proposed or for their extension ( as in the case of anti-trust) is based on the wholly inadequate and Utopian model of 'market failure' derived from the 'nirvana economics' of the Arrow-Debreu model. From the more appropriate classical notion of competition, revived most comprehensively by the UCLA industrial organization school (see Demsetz (1988 Demsetz ( , 1989 ), there is no case for anti-trust legislation either nationally or internationally.
capital gains and other divergences from correct accounting. As Sinn also notes, with reference to the emerging tax harmonization in the EU, the emerging tax regime in an integrated economy will imply that only immobile factors of production will ultimately be taxable. He laments the limit this will place on the redistributive abilities of European governments-particularly on financing their welfare states. But for classical liberals, who have always opposed the predatory state's corruption of the polity by using other people's money to demonstrate its 'compassion, this is an outcome to be devoutly wished.
For the natural monopoly elements in infrastructure services, the appropriate policy is to organize auctions for 'competition for the field' for their provision (on the lines set out in Demsetz (1989) Chp.6 ). Again no regulatory regime is requires.
While the economics seems clear-cut, the attempt to roll back existing and prevent future regulations is hampered by the political economy of predatory democratic states, as witness the signal failure of the Republican Congressional majority in its attempts to do so in the US. To deal adequately with this issue would take me too far afield. But I have recently come to the view that many of these problems are due to the growing moral incoherence of the West. (Lal (199833, 1998c) . However, there may hopefully be an antidote. In particular, the US's attempts to legislate its changing and fractured morality (public and private) world wide (eg. the Helms-Burton bill and other claims to extra territorial rights to impose sanctions in line with its moral preferences) is now increasingly meeting resistance from the Rest.
Though there is still the danger that this might trigger that 'clash of civilizations' hypothesized by Huntington, I am more hopeful that (as is happening in the talks on Helms-Burton between the US and the EU) an international 'disarmament' agreement will be reached where countries will forbear from imposing their ethics on others. If this happens, we will have international competition amongst national regulatory regimes (with no extraterritorial reach). As in the case of competition between tax jurisdictions, this global competition amongst national regulatory regimes should be viewed with a benign eye by classical liberals. As in most forms of competition, the converse of Gresham's law should apply with the bad being displaced by the good, i.e minimal or no regulation. What must be resisted are the various moves by international agencies to create a centralized international regulatory regime.
This brings us to the regulation of financial flows. There are two issues. The first concerns the need to regulate financial and banking institutions both nationally and internationally. Here the mainstream justification is again based on 'market failure'. ( See eg. King (1990) ). First, on the purported asymmetries of information between buyers and sellers of financial services which it is claimed create the need for investor protection. Second, the externalities which are supposed to arise when the distress of financial institutions is supposed to lead to 'systemic' problems.
Neither argument is cogent. There is no reason why the asymmetries in information should be anymore severe in financial as opposed to many other markets providing goods and services: eg.
for household goods and repairs, car maintenance, and those for second hand consumer durables. If there is no need for these markets to be publicly regulated why should there be for financial But we do not seek to eliminate industrial bankruptcies on the grounds of systemic dangers, so why should we do so for financial institutions?
The special problems relating to financial institutions arise (as is well known) because of the moral hazard created by implicit or explicit public insurance of their deposits.This, and the fact that their business is to deal with 'paper promises', makes them prone to fraud. Which in turn leads to the perhaps justifiable demand that, as it seems politically impossible to dispense with deposit insurance, regulation is needed to create transparency in the reporting of their balance sheets as well as for the enforcement of capital adequacy criteria on these financial institutions.
I discuss this aspect of the 'moral hazard' associated with bank lending in the context of I2 A number of other arguments for international co-operation based on pecuniary externalities are critically examined in my 1990 Wincott lecture (La1 (1990) ).
international capital markets below.
Before that we also need to take account of another view, which sees financial markets as being inherently unstable and requiring regulation to create greater 'economic security'. (see Minsky (1977) , Kindleberger (!978)). The global equity and financial market has been described as a giant casino which needs to be controlled in the interests of the non-gambling majority of the world's citizens. (see Strange (1986) ). Speculative bubbles in which over-lending is followed by collapse and crisis are purported to be endemic in capitalist economies which then require a lender of last resort to mitigate the deflationary impact of a financial crash caused by the panic following the mania which caused the bubble.13 As Flemming (1982) rightly notes about this argument, it assumes that "enterprises adopt excessively exposed I3 In this context it should be noted that there is also a large academic literature on floating exchange rates which claims that an international regime based on them is prone to speculative bubbles which lead to sustained divergences of exchange rates from their economic 'fundamentals'. The best critique and discussion of this literature on rational speculative bubbles is Mussa (1990) . As he concludes: "A rational speculative bubble implies not only that people are sometimes crazy, but that they are systematically, calculatingly, and fanatically insane... I conclude therefore that rational speculative bubbles are empirically irrelevant and theoretically absurd" The 
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In addition to the two problems mentioned in the text there were two other factors responsible for the Asian financial crisis. The first was the quasi fixed exchange rate regime in many countries. It is increasingly becoming clear that only two exchange rate regimes are viable in a globalized capital market: a freely floating rate or a rigidly fixed one as in a currency board. These are the only ones which allow automatic adjustment to external and internal shocks without any need for discretionary action by the authorities who do not have the time or the information to deal with the actions of a highly decentralized but integrated global capital market mediating these shocks. Their actions are often inappropriate leading to serious misalignments of the real exchange rate.
Second, the crisis showed up a systematic fault in the 'Asian' model of development in which there was a close linkage between the domestic banking system, large industrial enterprises and the government. By making the banking system the creature of the government's will, it creates tremendous moral hazard in the domestic banking system. When this moral hazard is combined with that created by the IMF for foreign bank lending, the economy is in double jeopardy. Foreign banks lending to domestic banks which know they will be bailed out, will over-end, leading to ropy investments and an eventual debt crisis for the country. serious problems of moral hazard in this part of the international capital market. The first problem implies that, when for some reason, there is a need for adjustment in the country which requires an exchange rate depreciation, the debt burden of the country denominated in local currency rises, the larger is the share of foreign bank loans denominated in foreign currency in its total debt exposure. This in itself would not matter, if the loans were contracted by private domestic agents and there was no implicit or explicit government guarantee. However, the actions of the IMF -the second problem-which has in effect become the international debt collector for foreign banks, belies the last assumption. La1 and Myint (1996) ).
Moreover, its foreign bank debt, apart from not being excessive, was also all private. When a run developed on these loans, following the panic introduced by the Thai crisis, and the rupiah had to be devalued, most of these private loans turned sour. In a well-functioning system the private borrowers would have defaulted on these loans, unless their bankers were willing to see this as a short run crisis and roll them over. But then, enter the IMF.
Following on its past record in the 1980's debt and 1990's Mexican crisis, the IMF, with the backing of the US and Japan (whose banks were the most exposed and stood to lose the most), declared that there was a systemic threat to the world financial system from an Indonesian private sector default. The Indonesian government, under the smoke screen of an IMF program, was forced to take on the private sector's liabilities and promise to pay off the foreign bankers through taxes on all its citizens. This has created a serious problem of moral hazard for this type of 25 lending. The smartest thing for any one to do today is to set up a foreign bank, make loans to the ropiest LDC firms at exorbitant interest rates, and when these turn sour say there is a danger to the world financial system, which the IMF will then seek to prevent by forcing the government to take over these debts and pay them back from taxing its citizens!
The ideal solution is of course to shut down the IMF.15
Since Nixon closed the Gold window it has been like Pirandello's play "Six characters in search of an author"-in search of a play.
Ever since its justification as the overseer of the gold exchange standard created at Bretton Woods collapsed, with the move to generalized floating, it has had no justification. It has smartly stepped into the opportunities offered by the 80's debt crisis and the problems created by the post 1989 East European countries moving from the Plan to the market. Whatever its achievements in these respects in the past, the recent East Asian crisis now shows it to be as much part of the problem as the solution.
Suppose, however, that it is not shut down, as there is no redundant international institution-from the ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO to UNCTAD-which has died. In that case, developing countries will have to live with the continuing moral hazard in the market for foreign bank loans. How should they deal with this? Many dirigiste governments are using this as an excuse to delay or prevent any I5 In its most recent play the supporters of the IMF want to convert it into an international lender of last resort. But this is totally misconceived. There are two functions that a lender of last resort has to perform as set out in Bagheot's rule. First, it should be able to create high powered money quickly to on-lend to solvent banks to prevent a liquidity crisis. Second, it must be able to distinguish between good and bad 'paper' and thus judge the soundness of the banks to which it is extending liquidity, with the insolvent banks being liquidated. The IMF is incapable of doing either. It can only lend after lengthy negotiations with a country's government and with the approval of the board. Second it has no way of sorting out the 'good' from 'bad' loans for instance made by foreign banks to residents in the country, and to liquidate the latter. The lender of last resort function for the money center banks involved in foreign lending must therefore continue to be provided by their parent central banks. 
